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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a Decision and Order issued by the Idaho Industrial Commission in a
workers' compensation case. The dispute involves the compensability of injuries sustained when
an injured worker is traveling from an employer-mandated medical evaluation. A hearing was
not held before the Industrial Commission, as the parties stipulated to the relevant facts.
Following the parties' submission of post-hearing briefs, the Commission found in favor or
Employer/Surety (hereafter Employer). Claimant/Appellant (hereafter Claimant) filed a timely
appeal from the Industrial Commission's decision.
As part of the Industrial Commission proceedings, the pmties stipulated to the following
facts:

I. On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston,
Idaho. At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter Surety).
2. On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject
to the provisions ofldaho's Worker's Compensation Law.
3. Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart
rolled over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with Blue
Ribbon on September 16, 2013.
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4. Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury
to her left foot.
5. On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant a
letter, which read as follows:
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an independent medical
evaluation with Robert Friedman. This appointment is scheduled for
November 15, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. and will be held at Kootenai Health
Plaza, which is located at 1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho.
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this appointment and
bring copies of all x-rays/MRI films with you. Failure to do so may
result in the termination of benefits and the responsibility for any "no
show" charges.
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for
reimbursement. This should include the date traveled, destination, and
round trip mileage.
6. It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace in
Lewiston, Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho.
7. Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho.
Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in
December in Lewiston. Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment in Post
Falls.
8. On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the suretyscheduled medical evaluation. On said date she was still an employee of Blue Ribbon and
was receiving time loss benefits from Surety.
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9. Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip from
Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston.
10. Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from
the appointment with Dr. Friedman.
11. At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles south
of Potlatch, it was snowing, and the road was covered with snow. At said location,
Claimant was southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford F150 lost
traction, crossed the centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle. Claimant's
actions did not cause or contribute to the collision.
12. As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical
injuries to her lower extremities. Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor
restricted her from any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until fmiher notice. As a
result of the crash, Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in Lewiston, Idaho, until
February 28, 2014.
R. pp. 9-11.
II.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether Claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered in an
automobile collision while returning from an Employer-scheduled medical evaluation related to
Claimant's ongoing workers' compensation claim.
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ARGUMENT
The provisions of Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally construed in
favor of the injured worker. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 P.2d
187 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759 (1996).

A. Idaho has adopted the Compensable Consequence Doctrine as set forth in Larson's
Workers' Compensation Law.

Larson's Workers' Compensation Law is heavily relied upon by administrative agencies
and courts throughout the United States. The Supreme Court of the State ofidaho has identified
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law as the leading authority on workers' compensation.
Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co. Inc., 112 Idaho 291, 732 P.2d 260 (1986). The Court often looks to
Larson's treatise when deciding Idaho workers' compensation cases.
In his treatise, Professor Larson advocates for the adoption of the compensable
consequence doctrine. This doctrine provides:
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause contributable to
the claimant's own intentional conduct.
1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. ch. 10 (2010).
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At the very foundation of the compensable consequence doctrine is a deviation from the
standard "course and scope" of employment requirements that generally govern the
compensability of an industrial injury:
Since, in the strict sense, none of the consequential injuries we are concerned with are in
the course of employment, it becomes necessary to contrive a new concept, which we
may for convenience call "quasi-course of employment." By this expression is meant
activities undertaken by the employee following upon his or her injury which, although
they take place outside the time and space limits of the employment, and would not be
considered employment activities for usual purposes, are nevertheless related to the
employment in the sense that they are necessary or reasonable activities that would not
have been undertaken but for the compensable injury.
Larson's,§ 10.05 at 10-11 (2010).
Professor Larson's example in his treatise of quasi-course activity is directly applicable to the
present case:
When the injury following the initial compensable injury arises out of a quasi-course
activity, such as a trip to the doctor's office, the chain of causation should not be
deemed broken by mere negligence in the performance of the activity, but only by
intentional conduct which may be regarded as expressly or impliedly prohibited by the
employer.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, while it has not adopted the compensable
consequence doctrine by name, has espoused the underlying legal principles of the compensable
consequence doctrine. In Grant v. Brownfield's Orthopedic & Prosthetic Co., 105 Idaho 542,671
P.2d 455 (1983), the employee Thelma Ruth Grant choked on a piece of chicken and died at an
employer-sponsored Christmas party. The issue before the Court was: "Does the accidental death

5

of an employee occuning at an employer-sponsored Christmas party arise out of and in the
course of employment for purposes of an award of workmen's compensation benefits?" In
analyzing the case, the Court utilized a number of questions from Section 22 of Larson's treatise:
1. Did the employer in fact sponsor the event?
2. Did the employer finance the occasion to a substantial extent?
3. Was there some encouragement to attend?

4. Did the employer benefit from the event?
Id. at 544-545.
Even though Mrs. Grant was attending a nonmandatory work party at the time of her death, the
Comi held: "... as a matter of law, the conclusion is inescapable that Mrs. Grant's fatal accident
occuned within the scope and course of her employment." Id. at 551.
According to Larson, the same test used to decide Grant is applicable to the case
presently before the Court:

It should be noted that the test adopted for the quasi-course cases is the same as that
shown in other parts of this Treatise to apply in a variety of situations which are marginal
so far as course of employment is concerned. These situations include ... the
recreational cases in Ch. 22, below ...
§ 10.05 at 10-11 (emphasis added).
If the conclusion of compensability was inescapable in Grant, then the same conclusion must be
equally or more inescapable in the case presently before the Court.
When one applies the questions from the Grant case to the case presently before the
Court, a conclusion of compensability is required:
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1. Did the employer in fact sponsor the [medical evaluation]?
Employer arranged and, per statute, paid for the medical evaluation. R. p. 10.
2. Did the employer finance the occasion to a substantial extent?
Employer paid for the evaluation. Per Idaho Code Section 72-433, Employer was
required to pay for Claimant's travel and time loss for the day of the evaluation.
3. Was there some encouragement to attend?
If she wanted to retain her workers' compensation benefits, Claimant was required by

statute to attend. By way of encouragement, Employer threatened to terminate benefits and
assess no show charges if Claimant failed to attend the scheduled evaluation. R. p. 10.
4. Did the employer benefit from the event?
The employer's possible benefit from the event is made clear by the fact that the
employer was willing to pay for the evaluation and pay for Claimant to travel to Post Falls in
November, instead of waiting for Claimant to see Dr. Friedman without travel expenses in
December. R. p. 10.
Furthermore, it is generally understood from a perusal of workers' compensation
decisions that employer-retained medical evaluators routinely find claimants medically stable
prior to other medical professionals, give lower impairment ratings than other medical
professionals, and give fewer permanent restrictions than other medical professionals. The
findings of an employer-retained medical evaluator often serve to decrease the amount of
benefits payable to an injured worker, thus benefiting the employer.
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If a worker is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for choking on a piece of
chicken at a nonmandatory Christmas party, then surely a worker who is injured while traveling
in compliance with Idaho law and her employer's insistence is entitled to workers compensation
benefits as well.
Claimant's travel to Post Falls for an Employer-scheduled medical evaluation is within
the course and scope of her employment pursuant to the quasi-course test as discussed by
Professor Larson and utilized by the Supreme Comi of Idaho in Grant.
Seven years after the Grant decision, the Industrial Commission formally cited and relied
on the compensable consequence doctrine as set forth in Professor Larson's treatise:

Range of Compensable Consequences - When the primary injury is shown to have arisen
out ofand in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the
injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result ofan independent
intervening cause attributable to the claimant's own intentional conduct.
The application of this rule is almost entirely limited to situations where a primary workrelated injury is followed by a later nonwork-related injury. The rule is remedial in
nature; its purpose, under such circumstances, is to assure the worker is compensated for
the later, nonwork-related injury by providing that such an injury "likewise arises out of
employment."
Keith v. Connors Logging, Inc., 1990 IIC 0660 (September 1990).
A search of Industrial Commission decisions reveals that since 1990, the Industrial Commission
has invoked the compensable consequence (also called compensable consequences and natural
compensable consequence) doctrine as the basis for awarding benefits in at least 30 cases.
The Industrial Commission cases that apply the compensable consequence doctrine are
not limited to cases where the original injury is worsened or exacerbated, but also find separate
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and distinct injuries compensable. In Lee v. J.R. Simplot Co., 1996 IIC 0019 (January 1996),
claimant suffered a work-related back injury. During vocational rehabilitation claimant
developed an upper extremity condition. The Commission held that the upper extremity
condition was a compensable consequence of the back injury. In Salvador2003 v. Fremont
Compensation, 2003 IIC 0258 (April 2003) claimant injured his back at work. While
participating in the LifeFit program for his back injury, claimant suffered a right shoulder injury.
The Commission held that the right shoulder injury was a compensable natural consequence of
the original back injury. In Nelson v. First Interstate Bank and Transportation Ins. Co., 2000 IIC
0914 (October 2000) claimant suffered a compensable right shoulder injury. The Commission
found that a subsequent left shoulder injury was a compensable consequence of the original right
shoulder injury.
The Commission's analysis of Claimant's injuries sustained in the motor vehicle collision
took place in a vacuum. The Commission completely ignored the close nexus to the original
work injury and the compensable consequence doctrine. In spite of the Grant case, and despite
the Commission's extensive history of relying on the compensable consequence doctrine, the
Commission erred when it denied Claimant benefits in the case presently before the Court.
B. Employer's requirement that Claimant travel to the Employer-scheduled medical
evaluation becomes by implication part of the employment contract.

In addition to quasi-course of employment, implied employment contract is another legal
theory underlying the compensable consequence doctrine. Many jurisdictions have held the
correlative duties imposed by statute on employers and injured workers become by implication
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part of the employment contract. Thereby bringing activities like travel to a mandatory doctor's
appointment within the course and scope of employment. For support of compensability of
injuries sustained while traveling to or from doctor's appointments, Professor Larson, cites the
arguments put forward in Taylor v. Centex Constr. Co.,191 Kan. 130,379 P.2d 217 (1963):
In the simple case, however, of a trip to the doctor's office necessitated by a compensable
injury, the arguments put forward by the Kansas court in the Taylor case are difficult to
answer. The court noted that the employer is under a statutory duty to furnish medical
care, and that the employee is similarly under a duty to submit to reasonable medical
treatment under the act. The provisions of the act, in turn, become by implication part of
the employment contract. This being so, the better view appears to be that accidental
injuries during a trip made pursuant to this statutory and contractual obligation are work
connected.
Larson's,§ 10.07 at 10-23 (2010).
The better view espoused by Larson is " that accidental injuries during a trip made pursuant to
this statutory and contractual obligation are work connected."
Like Kansas, California reached similar conclusions in Laines v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 48 Cal.App.3d 872 (1975), and Durham Transportation Co. v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 68 Cal.Comp.Cases 469 (2003). The California Court of Appeals and the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board both held that injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision while
traveling to or from a medical facility necessitated by a compensable industrial injury are
compensable consequences of the industrial injury. In atTiving at its conclusion, the Court
reasoned that the injured worker was required to submit to examination as a condition of
receiving compensation.
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Similar to Kansas and California, Idaho law authorizes employers to require claimant's
submission to a medical examination. Idaho Code Section 72-433 reads: "employee, ifrequested
by the employer ... , shall submit himself for examination at reasonable times and places to a
duly qualified physician or surgeon." The employer is responsible to pay for the medical
evaluation, the injured workers' travel expenses, and for loss of wages. What is more, according
to Idaho Code Section 72-434, the injured workers' right to prosecute his workers' compensation
case and receive workers' compensation benefits shall be suspended if the injured worker
umeasonably fails to submit to an examination scheduled by the employer. Thus, by statute, the
employer has complete control, within reason, over an injured employee with respect to
scheduling the time and place of a medical examination.
In the case before the Court, if Claimant did not attend the Employer-scheduled medical
examination, her benefits could be terminated. Ongoing approval of her workers' compensation
benefits and the ability to prosecute her case were contingent on traveling to Employer's chosen
doctor at a time and place beyond Claimant's control.
The statutory authority of an employer and the coffelating requirement of an employee
are by implication part of the employment contract. Claimant's mandatory attendance at the
employer-scheduled medical examination must be by implication part of the employment
contract. Therefore, her injuries while traveling to the evaluation were sustained within the
course of her employment.
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traveling employee.
In light of the implied employment contract discussed above, the Court must consider
whether Claimant's injuries sustained while traveling are covered by workers' compensation. An
employee traveling to and from work is not normally within the course of employment and is not
covered by workers' compensation. Clark v. Daniel Morine Const., 98 Idaho 114, 559 P.2d 293
(1977).
Idaho, however, has adopted the "traveling employee" doctrine:
When an employee's work requires the employee to travel away from the employer's
place of business or employee's normal place of work, the employee will be within the
course and scope of employment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct
departure for personal business occurs.
Andrews v. Les Bois Masonry. Inc., 127 Idaho 65, 896 P.2d 973 (1995).
As set forth above, Employer required Claimant to travel away from her normal place of work.
Claimant did not depart from her travel for personal business. Therefore, Claimant's injuries
sustained while traveling at Employer's request fall squarely within the exception to the rule that
an employee's travel is not covered by workers' compensation.

D. Prior Idaho Supreme Court precedent is distinguishable.
In 1963 the Idaho Supreme Court decided the case of Kiger v. The Idaho Corp. and
Employers Fire Ins. Co., 85 Idaho 424,380 P.2d 208 (1963). In Kiger the claimant was traveling
to a routine doctor's appointment for a compensable workers' compensation injury when she was
involved a car accident. Limiting its analysis to injuries sustained while in the strict "course of
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employment", the Court found that injuries sustained in the automobile accident were not
compensable under the workers' compensation claim.
Unlike the case presently before the Court, the claimant in Kiger had set her own doctor's
appointment. She decided when and where she would receive her medical care. What is more,
there is no indication in Kiger that the employer was compensating claimant for her travel.
Whereas, in the present case, Surety, not Claimant, controlled where and when Claimant had to
travel. Employer told Claimant to attend the medical examination 125 miles from home and that
"failure to do so may result in the termination of benefits." Furthermore, Employer advised
Claimant: "You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for reimbursement." R.
p. 10.
What is more, Kiger was decided in 1963, prior to the Grant case that clearly departed
from the strict course of employment analysis. Kiger was also decided prior to the
comprehensive revision ofldaho's workers' compensation laws in 1971 and prior to Idaho's
adoption of the compensable consequence doctrine. As previously discussed, the Idaho Industrial
Commission has invoked the compensable consequence doctrine at least 30 times since 1990 to
find claims compensable. By its very definition, the compensable consequence doctrine makes
injuries that are not incurred in the strict "course of employment" compensable.
The facts in Kiger are clearly distinguishable from the case presently before the
Commission. Moreover, the law as applied in Kiger is inconsistent with the cun-ent state of
Idaho's workers' compensation law. Claimant's injuries from the motor vehicle collision are a
compensable consequence of her September 16, 2013, industrial injury.
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E. The majority of jurisdictions have held that injuries sustained in motor vehicle
collisions that occur while traveling to or from the doctor are compensable.
Consistent with the compensable consequence doctrine, Professor Larson reports that
accidents during trips to the doctor's office are generally compensable:
§ 10.07 Accident During Trip to Doctor's Office

When an employee suffers additional injuries because of an accident in the course of a
journey to a doctor's office occasioned by a compensable injury, the additional injuries
are generally held compensable ...
Larson's,§ 10.07 at 10-19 (2010).
In addition to Kansas and California, Idaho's neighboring jurisdictions of Oregon and
Washington have held that injuries sustained while traveling for a workers' compensation case
are compensable.
In Fenton v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 87 Or.App. 78, 741 P.2d 517, review denied, 304
Or. 311, 744 P.2d 1295 (1987), the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that, "when a worker is
injured in an accident which occurs during a trip to see a physician for treatment of a
compensable injury, the new injury is also compensable."
In Iris Vandorn, BIIA Dec., 02 11466 (2003), the Washington Board oflndustrial
Insurance Appeals found that the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision on a return trip
from a vocational appointment, made at the direction of the Department of Labor and Industries,
were compensable. As persuasive authority, the Board cited Larson's Workers Compensation

14

Law with respect to travel to and from medical appointments in allowing the injuries sustained in
the collision as a compensable consequence of the previously compensable injury.
The following jurisdictions have also held that injured workers who suffer additional
injuries traveling to or from medical appointments required by or authorized by the
surety/employer are covered by workers' compensation under the previously compensable injury:
Arizona in Joplin v. Industrial Comm'n, 175 Ariz. 524,858 P.2d 669 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1993);
Colorado in Excel Corp. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 860 P.2d 1393 (Colo. App. 1993);
Nebraska in Straub v. City of Scottsbluff, 280 Neb. 163, 784 N.W.2d 886 (2010); Georgia in
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 177 Ga. App. 242,339 S.E.2d 292 (1985);
Minnesota in Pedersen v. Maple Island Inc., 256 Minn. 21, 97 N.W.2d 285 (1959); Mississippi in
Charles N. Clark Associates, Ltd. v. Dependents of Robinson, 357 So.2d 924 (1978, Miss); New
Jersey in Camp v. Lockheed Electronics, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 535,429 A.2d 615, cert. den. 87
N.J. 415,434 A.2d 1090 (1981); New York in Consolazio v. Merchants Mutual Ins., 709
N.Y.S.D.2d 191 (A.D. 2 Dept. 2000); Maryland in Harris v. Mackin & Associates, 100 Md.App.
363,641 A.2d 938 (Md.App. 1994); Pennsylvania in Berro v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd. (Terminix Intern. Inc.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 298, 645 A.2d 342 (1994); Shuler v. Gregory Elec.,
366 S.C. 435, 622 S.E.2d 569 (Ct. App. 2005); and Virginia in Immer & Co. v. Brosnahan, 207
Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254 (1967).
Employer argued before the Commission that Idaho should adopt the minority position,
and deny Claimant's claim for benefits for injuries sustained in the automobile collision. R. p. 34.
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First, Employer cites the Wyoming case of \Vyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation
Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 372 (Wyo.1997). Unlike Idaho, Wyoming has not adopted the
compensable consequence doctrine. Instead, Wyoming has adopted the "second compensable
injury rule", which applies "when an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring
additional medical intervention." Yenne-Tulley v. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170,
172 (Wyo. 2000). Bruhn is inconsistent with the Grant case and inconsistent with the Industrial
Commission's adoption of the compensable consequence doctrine. Thus, Bruhn is neither
persuasive nor instructive in the case presently before the Court.
Employer also cites an Ohio Court of Appeals decision from 1959 as authority. Ohio, it
appears, has not adopted compensable consequence doctrine. Ohio, as set forth by Employer, has
adopted what equates to a greater risk analysis: "Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard that
we are all equally exposed to - bad road conditions. 11 R p 33 (emphasis in original). The Idaho
Supreme Court, however, has explicitly rejected the greater risk analysis:
In this case, the appellants suggest a return to the rationale of Wells by requiring Spivey
to prove that her job duties placed her at a greater risk for injury than that encountered by
the general public performing the same physical motions. However, a greater risk
analysis is no longer required of a claimant in light of Mayo and Kessler.
Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002).
Defendants also cite Michigan decisions form 1942 and 1990. Like Wyoming, and unlike
Idaho, it appears that Michigan has not adopted the compensable consequence doctrine as
defined by Professor Larson.
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Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions and with Idaho's adoption of the
compensable consequence doctrine, Claimant's motor vehicle collision should be a compensable
consequence of her September 16, 2013, work injury.

IV.
CONCLUSION
If Claimant had not been hurt at work on September 16, 2013, then Employer would not
have been able to demand Claimant's attendance in Post Falls for a medical evaluation.
Claimant's sole purpose in travelling to Post Falls on November 15, 2013, was to comply with
the Employer-mandated medical evaluation.
The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho and the Industrial Commission have
consistently invoked the principles of the compensable consequence doctrine. Pursuant to the
compensable consequence doctrine, the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle collision of
November 15, 2013, are a compensable consequence of her September 16, 2013, work injury.
Wherefore, Claimant respectfully requests that the Court find the injuries sustained in the
motor vehicle collision a compensable consequence of Claimant's original work injury.

GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP

______
,

Michael Kessinger
Attorney for Appellant
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